Abstract-Time-sensitive nobile commerce is vulnerable to message authentication delays. Significant power consumption incurred by cryptography is another limiting factor of most mobile devices. In this paper, we present a scalable mobile cryptosystem, which installs a group key and an elliptic curve privatelpublic key pair in each device to enable both symmetric key and public key cryptography. Scalable key establishment protocols and secure routing protocols with scalable authentication are proposed to make tradeoffs between security and energy, according to different mobile applications.
INTRODUCTION
Secure and fast transmission of sensitive digital information ovcr wireless channels has become increasingly important. The use of public key cryptography consumes a significant portion of the overall system resource. The computation complexity of symmetric key based operations fi negligible, but the key management for symmetric key based systcin is complicated, and is always subject to attack by adversaries.
A practical mobile cryptosystem should provide the customer flexible choices for balances between security; performance and power efficiency. The security requirements arc different for different information to transmit, under different circumstances, or with different available resources. For instance, a customer may wish to use a pre-installed group key to authenticate his message when the battery is low, or the message sent in not important, while risk the security compromise of a node inside the group. It should also be able to operate several different tasks for different security/energy requirements. For applications with a low security requirement such as toydgames automation and small home light control network, energy efficiency is more important and we can use symmetric cipher encryption and authentication. In security sensitive deployments such as military service, oil site operation, and hospital monitoring, it must be able to do asymmetric cipher operation for a stronger and scalable security feature. Therefore, in this paper we present a scalable mobile cryptosystcm, which installs a group key and an elliptic curve privatelpublic key pair into each device before they enter the mobile network, to enable both symmetric key and public key cryptography.
In section 2 of this paper, we propose scalable key establishment protocols in mobile network for applications with different security and energy requirements. Section 3 presents secure routing protocols with scalable authentication schemes. A group key is used to authenticate data with less 11. SCALABLE KEY ESTABLISHMENT In this section, we propose three different key establishment protocols for mobile networks according to different application scenarios, the first one based on pure symmetric key cryptography and suitable for toysfgames home networking, the second based on a hybrid of symmetric key and public key cryptography and designed for residential or small commercial wireless network deployment, and the last one based on pure public key cryptographic operations and targeting large industrial or military applications.
Perrig et al. present t o use trusted third parties to assist node-to-node key agreement [I] . We call this'trusted third party a security manager. A security manager is granted special capabilities to assist in provisioning link keys to other end mobile devices on-site. The security manager should first establish a link key with an end device before it can install link keys into that device for secure communicating with other end devices inside the mobile cluster. One way to accomplish the initial link key establishment task is to pre-install a master key table into each device. However, mobile networks may be highly versatile, involving temporary communications between devices that may have never met before. Thus we cannot predict and install all master keys needed for devices before they join the network, especially for large-scale wireless ad hoc networks. An altemative way is to use a shared group key [2] that is pre-loaded into each device in our proposed cryptosystem. Then when two devices want to establish a link key, they use this group key to encrypt and exchange their ephemeral key contribution data. Since the group key is fixed, the trust relationship is based merely on the knowledge of the other device's extended IEEE 64-bit address. The computation complexity and power consumption of symmetric key cryptographic operations are negligible when compared with public key schemes. However, a common group key poses a security risk if any one device is compromised. Therefore, this pure symnetric key based key establishment protocol in applications that require the least security protection, such as the home toyslgames automation. The certificate generation processes for end device U and security manager V are performed offline and before they join the network. When they first communicate to each other, they execute our hybrid key establishment protocol as below:
Of devices, and put the cryptographic burden where the resources are less constrained. End mobile devices are much more battery and computational resources limited. However, the security manager' means powered and more computational powerful. The hybrid key establishment protocol reduces the high cost elliptic curve random point scalar multiplications at the end device side and replaces them with low cost and efficient symmetric key based operations.
To prevent the impersonation attack, we use certificates in our key-establishment protocol, which provide a mechanism to check cryptographically to whom the public key belongs and if the device is a legitimate member of a particular network. In our mobile cryptosystem, we use the elliptic curve implicit certificate scheme [4], because of the resulting low communication complexity, which is a dominant factor for low bit transmission channels in sensor networks.
First, an ellipiic curve E defined over GF@) (where p is the characteristic of the base field) with suitable coefficients and a base point P o f large order n is selected and made public to d l users. CA selects a random integer 9rr as its static private key, and computes the static public key @I,. = q c A x P .
To obtain a certificate and the static private-public key pair, an end device U randomly selects a temporary key pair (g,,, G,) and sends G,, to CA. CA verifies U's identity and the authenticity of the request received from U CA also selects a temporary key pair (g<.<,G<;,,) and computes the elliptic curve point E,, = G,j + G c A , The implicit certificate lC, for U is constructed as the concatenation of CA's static public key Q,,, , the device identity ID, , the elliptic curve point B,, and
i.e.,
/C,. =(Q,,/D,,B,,r,).
CA following the conversion routine described in Section 4.1.3 of [5] . U also computes its static private key 4,: = sL, + g,, ' e , , (mod n) and its public key Qu = qu x P . U 1. U and V send to each other their implicit certificates.
The content of the certificate is verified at the other side, including the device identity and the validity period. If any check fails, the protocol is terminated.
V computes the hash value H ( / C , )
and derives an integer e,, from H(/C,,)following the conversion routine described in Section 4. . U c a n conclude that R 6 calculated from genuine Q,. , provided that V later evidences knowledge of the corresponding private key q v . U then encrypts c(, by using the provably secure elliptic cure encryption [6] , and sends to VE=(D,,,(c, l l r ) 6 3 R z ) = ( E j , e 2 ) .
4. V decrypts the received message and obtains R by calculating q,.xE, =qvd,,xP=d,,xQ, = R . V then computes U = ep 63 R s , and checks if E, = H ( u ) x P . It yes, V gets ci , as the most significant k bits of U. Otherwise, the protocol is terminated. V thenselects a k-bit random number cv as its link key contribution, and encrypts cv concatenated with its identity ID,, using symmetric key encryption under key c~, , generating y = Ec,,(/Dv ( 1 c,.) . Note that proper encryption mode needs to be used, such as the Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, which ensures that there is no my for any device Wto derive E,,, (c,.) from E,,,(/Dv 11 e,) and change thit value. V sendsy to U. can produce the correct response. In addition, an adversary cannot obtain any information of cu and c,. if both the symmetric and ECC cncryption schemes are secure, which implies the link key contribution of each side is transferred securely to the othcr part.
Y computes
This hybrid key establishment protocol consumes more nodc energy as compared to thc purc symmetric key based protocol. However, since we verify the binding of the sensor's private key q,!to its public key Q,, in step 6 and I through a lincar combination of the static key and the ephemeral key, rathcr than a multiplicative combination as in other ECC based pure public key protocols, at least one expensive elliptic-curve scalar multiplication of a random point is moved to the security manager side, and is replaced by one low cost modular multiplication, one modular addition and one symnictric kcy decryption. Therefore, our hybrid key establishment protocol is faster and saves more node energy than other public key based protocols, as evidenced by running our protocol on Mitsubishi's I &bit single-chip microprocessor MI6C. The whole protocol execution time on end device side is about 760 nisec, while ECMQV protocol with ECC XS09
ccrtificates F] and implicit ccrtificates @] takes I 1 10 msec and I155 msec respectively, and the Elliptic-Curve DifFieHcllmiin Ephemeral (ECDHE) protocol [5] takes 1350 nisec.
The hybrid key establishment protocol has much better security enhancement than our first pure symmetric key based protocol, while has moderate energy consumption on end mobile devices. We notice that if the security manager's private key is compromised, then all the link keys from earlier runs can be recovered from the transcripts. However, the corruption of the sensor node does not help to reveal the link keys. Therefore, our scheme provides half forward secrecy and is suitable to use in residential and small commercial mobile applications where security is important but not critical, and we can trade security for mobile usen' energy efficiency.
To provide full forward secrecy, rather than being encrypted under a symmetric key c " , cI. should be sent to U in a similar way that cii is sent to V (i.e., through secure elliptic cure cncryption PI), and only U with its ephemeral private key can reconstruct it. Then our hybrid protocol is modified into a pure ECC based public-key key establishment protocol. However, this requires additional expensive elliptic curve random point multiplications on mobile user side, and is opposite to our purpose of offloading the computation burden of end devices. The pure ECC based public-key key establishment protocol is suitable to vital or security-sensitive network deployments, including natural disaster control, battlefield service, rescue missions, etc., where security is more important than energy efficiency.
SECURE ROUTING WITH SCALABLE AUTHENTICATION
Most of the proposed secure routing protocols in wireless networks are based on authentication in the route discovery process. Seldom work has been done to detect faulty links based on observation of misbehavior in the data forwarding phase. Awerbuch et al. [7] address the Byzantine failure problem by using adaptive probing techniques. Unfortunately, malicious nodes can differentiate probing packets and normal data packets and therefore can selectively forward the probing packets to avoid detection. Herzberg and Kutten E] have proposed the combination use of acknowledgements, timeouts and fault announcements, to detect packet forwarding faults.
The protocols are only presented in an abstract model, a realization of which is proposed by Avramopoulos et al. @I.
They propose a source routing protocol with Byzantine robustness by utilizing reserved buffer, sequence number and authentication of data and control packets based on message authentication codes. However. the authentication of data and control packets is based on message authentication cdde, which requires a separate authentication tag for each of the intermediate router, thus adding a lot of communication overhead when multkhops are used.
To detect faulty links, we use acknowledgements, timeouts and fault announcements described in [8, 91 . However to reduce the communication overhead, we can still use a shared group key to authenticate dl the data and control packets. With a fixed group key, the senderjust needs to calculate and attach onc authentication tag for each data and control packet.
While this group key approach is efficient both in terms of
The 14m iEEE 2003 International Symposium on Persona1,lndwr and Mobile Radio Communication Prmeedings computation and communication overhead, it just mitigates outside attacks and does not protect against compromise of a single node. Therefore, it is more appropriate to use in applications with less security requirements, such as home automation applications, or when the node is in low power status and hence energy efficiency and performance are more important than security.
For commercial and military applications with a high security requirement, keeping the network available for its intended use is essential. We propose to use the Guy Fawkes protocol [IO] for authentication, such that only a single authentication tag is attached for each data or control packet, and therefore can save more communication overhead than the detection scheme proposed by Avramopoulos et al [9] .
We assume the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol is used in the mobile network we envision. Now assume that the sourceShasasequence ofpackets(m,,ni,,.. a signature over ( m , , h ( X , ) ) signed by the sender's private key. With its public key, every downstream router can verify that ( i l l , , h ( X , ) ) is valid and indeed generated by the claimed source node. Then each downstream router creates a new route table entry (S,e,,e, ) associated with this sources, where e, = h ( X , ) and e, = h ( r i $ , / i ( X 2 ) , & ) , which will be used to authenticate the future message from the same source. An elliptic curve digital signature algorithm (ECDSA) can be used here due to a small size of the ECC key, faster processing speed and smaller communication complexity.
Sig(m,,h(X,))is
When sending the second packet m 2 , the source selects another password Xj and forwards the second message MSC, to the first downstream router: n i 2 , h ( X z ) , . Y , ) received in MSC,, and checks if the result is equivalent to the previously received value e2 in A4SC,, If the check succeeds, the authenticity of 0%. h(X,)) is verified. Hence, the intermediate router knows that this message is indeed from the source node, and the content is not modified. It then updates the stored value of e, and e, as e, = h(X,) and e, = h ( 4 , h ( X 3 ) , X 2 ) .
MSG, = lm:, h ( X~) , X~, k(m,, h(X,
The message MSG, is fonvarded to the next hop as specified in the packet header.
Similarly, when sending the k-th ( k 2 2 ) packet mk , t h e source selects a new password X,,, and forwards the k-th message MSG, : modified (m,,h(X,),Xk.,) in MSC,. In either case, the node ni will drop the packet. Consequently, node nja cannot get a valid ACK after timeout, and it will either report a link error of (n,-,,n,) by itself, or the node n,-* will report an error of (nr.>,n,-,) to the source node. In either case, the detected fault link includes the malicious node n,+.
When the destination receives a data packet i n , , it verifies the authenticity of the packet in the same way as the intermediate routers do. If any of the checks fails, then the packet is dropped. If bth checks succeed, it schedules an ACK for transmission along the reverse of the path that the packet traversed. The ACK reflects the packet identification number k . The destination also appends an authentication tag to the ACK whose purpose is to authenticate it to all upstream routers. The authentication tag bears the same structure as the one generated by the source. Specifically, when sending ACK, for the first packet m,, the destination randomly selects two passwords and Y, , and sends the following information:
ACK,,h(Y;),SIg(nCK,.h(Y,)),h(ACK:,k(Y~),Y,)
Similarly, Sig (ACK,,h(Y,) ) is used to verify (ACK,,h(Y,)) to each upstream router. Whcn sending acknowledgement for packet PI, ( k B 2 ), the dcstination selects a new password V , , and forwards: Ji(Y,), Y,.,,WCK,,, ,M<+,) ,< 1 .
If the tinieout at an intermediate router expires, it schedules for transmission to the upstream path an FA for the first downstream link. The FA reflects the identification number of the packet and also bears a similar authentication tag, for authentication the FA to upstream routers.
The other part of the protocol is the same as in [9] . When an intermediate router receives an ACK, i t verifies its authenticity and that a timcout is pending for the corresponding data packet. If any check fails, it drops the ACK. Otherwise it cancels the timeout and further forwards the ACK. When an intermediate router receives an FA, it verifies its authenticity, it verifies that a timeout is pending for the corresponding data packet and that the link reported in the FA is the first downstream to the node that generated it. If any check fails, it drops the FA. Otherwise, it cancels the timeout and further forwards the FA.
If the timcout at the source expires, then it deletes the first downstream link from its Route Cache. It then finds a new path to the destination in its cached routes and reprocesses the '' failed" packet as if it were a new packet. If the source receives an ACK, , it assumx successful delivery of the packet 1 1 1 ) . If the sourcc receives an authentic FA, then it deletes the link in the FA from its Route Cache, provided that this is the downstream link of the router that generated the FA. It then rediscovcrs a new path to ;he destination and reprocesses thc '* failed'' packet.
Notc that a prerequisite of our protocol is that M S . , he recciiwxl before MSGt, which is true, since all the packets are forwarded along the same path in DSR, and in case of congestion and buffering, MSC,, is stored in the buffer hefore !MSG, and therefore, will always he transmitted before MSG, .
We assume that each link has one a-priori reserved buffer for every source router in the network as also described in [9] . This ensures that normal packets are never dropped because of congestion. Authentication ensures that the reserved buffer is allocatcd to its intended source and protect against vicious flooding the network with unauthenticated packets. Malicious nodes that send packets frequently will soon use up all the buffer space allocated to them and the not served old packets will be discarded.
With authentication. the link containing a black hole or any passive attacker railing to forward packets to the destination can be dctected since a malicious node does not hold the destination's secret key or password to be used, and thus cannot fabricate an ACK with a valid authentication tag.
The Guy Fawkcs authentication tag alsosafeguards against replay. In a replay attack, an intermediate router stores authentic packets and introduces them at a later time into the network in order to "take out" new packets. In our protocol, a new packet is sent with a different password and the check on the rcplaycd password fails when an intermediate node compares the hash of the password with the hash value it received in the previous message.
In our scheme, the authentication tag of each packet bears only two hashes and one password, while in the detection protocol introduced in [9] , L authentication tags must be attached for L hops, and therefore, OUT scheme has a much smaller communication overhead. In the first step of our protocol. the authentication is based on ECDSA digital signature, while in later steps all authentications are done by symmetric key operations. Thereforc, this scheme has a moderate computation overhead but with more security enhancement han our first routing protocol based on group key authentication.
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. CONCLUSION Scalable features are especially dcsirable for applications in low-power mobile cryptosystem. In this paper, we present a scalable mobile cryptosystem, which installs a group key and an elliptic curve private/public key pair into each device to enable scalable security processing. We propose scalable key establishment protocols and secure routing protocols with scalable authentication schemes, in which different security and energy tradeoffs are enabled for different application scenarios. The system user should choose the hest appropriate protocol, by taking into account the level of security range required and the operational cost that the user is willing to accept.
